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The architecture of modern mathematics: Essays in history and philosophy, edited by Jose´
Ferreiro´s and Jeremy J. Gray, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, xii + 442 pp.
In this volume, Ferreiro´s and Gray have brought together a selection of 14 new essays
(only one of them published before) that share a commitment to integrating the philo-
sophical reflection of mathematics with the close historical study of the development of
mathematical practices and ideas. In the resulting volume, philosophy and history do not
play exactly symmetrical roles: All contributions (with the possible exception of the intro-
duction) present themselves as historical essays that highlight some philosophical aspects
rather than the other way round. The papers are concerned with mathematical developments
between 1800 and 1970, and the majority of them focus on the contributions of one or two
great mathematicians within a specific area of mathematics.
The book opens with a long and spirited introduction by the editors, in which they adopt
a critical stance towards contemporary mainstream philosophy of mathematics. They see
it dominated by attempts to apply “systematic philosophy” to mathematics. The resulting
paradigm is criticized for various shortcomings: It tends to ignore the conceptual and
methodological dynamics of mathematics; it over-emphasizes one element of mathematical
practice (viz., proving theorems within the framework of a given axiomatic system) at the
expense of other, philosophically no less interesting ones (like conjecturing, explaining, or
visualizing); it is obsessed with its pet theories, logic and set theory, and therefore often
fails to acknowledge the richness of mathematical concepts and methods; it has suffered
from “excessive attention to all-inclusive claims” (p. 18). Such deficiencies, the editors
suggest, can be overcome by means of a closer integration of the history and philosophy
of mathematics, geared to an ideal of “philosophical reflection” rather than “systematic
philosophy”. To be sure, similar criticisms have been raised before (for example in Kitcher
and Aspray’s introduction to their Minnesota Studies volume of 1988), and the editors
explicitly acknowledge this. Yet one can hardly contest their diagnosis that, by and large,
the received picture of the philosophy of mathematics has not changed much during the last
50 years (p. 4 f.). This is despite the many valuable investigations along the lines suggested
by Ferreiro´s and Gray that have of course already been undertaken (among others, by many
of the contributors to their volume). Given this, the editors’ initiative to present a good
selection of recent samples of this work is all the more welcome.
Many of the contributions focus on the philosophical ideas developed by great mathe-
matical practitioners in the context of their work. For example, Jamie Tappenden alerts
his readers to the fact that during the time of Frege’s mathematical upbringing, which oc-
curred in a context where analysis was widely perceived as a core discipline of mathematics,
there was no consensus about what exactly analysis was. In particular, a Weierstrassian
tradition with an emphasis on rigor and avoidance of appeal to geometric intuition clashed
with a Riemannian one that permitted the application of geometric tools to analysis and
pursued conceptual clarity and simplicity as a primary goal. Frege’s siding with Riemann’s
understanding of complex analysis is then shown to be continuous with some of his logico-
philosophical insights—e.g., that a function is not an expression and that definitions should
be representation-independent.
Riemann himself and his philosophical ideas are subjected to a close investigation in
another contribution. Jose´ Ferreiro´s argues that the key to Riemann’s philosophy of mathe-
matics is his involvement with physics, which for a while was so serious that he regarded his
quest for a unified theory of physical forces as his main occupation. According to Ferreiro´s,
this led Riemann to view mathematics as a part of the natural sciences, which implied the
abandonment of its a priori status.
Michael Beaney’s paper invites reflections on the historicity of philosophical ideas in
mathematics itself, as he reviews the role of historical references in Frege’s work and how
they relate to his pursuit of the elucidation (“Erla¨uterung”) of expressions. The use of
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historical reference-points like Kant is shown often to be an important part of Fregean
elucidation, which is itself an indispensable task as not every expression can be defined in
terms of more basic ones.
The volume also contains papers on more unusual and idiosyncratic philosophical ideas
of mathematicians. For example, Erhard Scholz portrays Hermann Weyl as an advocate
of a “symbolic realism”, according to which mathematics acquires meaning from contexts
of scientific, technical and social practices, while questions concerning its fundamental on-
tology should be regarded in an agnostic way. Moritz Epple juxtaposes Felix Hausdorff
with his literary alter ego Paul Mongre´, under which name he published several pieces of
fiction and philosophical reflections in a broadly Nietzschean vein. Epple tries to unearth the
common epistemological concerns of the mathematician and the literary writer. Alongside
such investigations of individual mathematicians and their philosophical agenda, the volume
also presents some interesting and more encompassing efforts to correlate and compare the
philosophical reactions of several different mathematicians to certain mathematical and sci-
entific developments. An example is Jeremy Gray’s closing essay on the profound changes
that transformed mathematics after 1880. He concentrates on geometry and identifies a
Leibnizian and a Kantian strategy of coping with the deep philosophical questions about
mathematical truth raised by, among other things, the advent of non-Euclidean geometry.
How can such historical studies of mathematicians’ philosophical ideas (there are several
more among the papers within this volume) support the philosophical reflection on math-
ematics demanded by the editors? I think they can play very helpful roles in this respect,
especially if they are concerned with influential, established, or at least coherently defensible
philosophical positions. They can serve to demonstrate the contingency of the ideas that
dominate the philosophical terrain, in the sense that they show how positions have emerged
from changes and tensions within mathematics at certain points in time (as in the case of
Frege). They can even highlight alternative paths (as, arguably, in the case of Riemann).
However, if the proposed convergence of history and philosophy of mathematics is to
show its whole potential, it must go beyond a mere history of philosophy of mathematics. It
must also prove its potential to use the history of mathematics in order to lead to convincing,
contemporary philosophical insights. The actual mathematical practices of the historical
protagonists often offer more important material than their own philosophical reflections.
As an illustration of this, Jeremy Avigad has contributed a paper on Dedekind’s theory of
ideals that exemplifies the great promise of an integrated history and philosophy of mathe-
matics. Among the more fascinating aspects of mathematical practice that has received too
little attention from traditional philosophy is its considerable freedom: Not only are there
myriads of new concepts and structures that could in principle be introduced and investi-
gated, but each of them can also be defined and approached in many very different ways.
A case in point is the theory of ideals and its different early treatments, most importantly
by Kronecker and Dedekind. Avigad traces the development of Dedekind’s several versions
of the theory in order to identify the mathematical values that informed his methodological
choices. In unexpressed analogy to the so-called “epistemic values” that are familiar from the
philosophy of the natural sciences, Avigad gives a precise description of principles of gener-
ality, uniformity, and familiarity as they appear in Dedekind’s work. The insights enabled by
this investigation promise to give rise to many interesting and potentially fruitful historical
and philosophical questions—e.g., how did certain mathematical values become established
in the mathematical community rather than others, how do they relate to the values of other
sciences and even to other (“extra-scientific”) values?
Most of the many interesting discussions in this volume offer impulses for philosophical
reflection rather than their own philosophical conclusions. An exception is the introduction,
where Ferreiro´s and Gray put forward a tentative “hypothetical conception of mathematical
practice”, which is designed to take the historical richness of the subject into account. It is
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meant to reflect an insight that most mathematical propositions cannot be taken to be “true in
the world we live in”, but must be seen as parts of systems based on hypotheses. How exactly
this is to be spelled out—and, in particular, how it relates to views that have been discussed
at length under the name “deductivism” or “if-thenism”—is not clear. Prima facie, the hard
problem for a hypothetical conception is to explain how a whole mathematical theory “is
erected on” its hypothetical basis (to use the authors’ expression), without loading all the
explosive philosophical freight onto an uncritical use of the notion of logical consequence
(as deductivism has been criticized of doing). Clearly, systematic philosophizing about
mathematics will have to be part and parcel of an integrated enterprise of the history and
philosophy of mathematics. Ferreiro´s and Gray’s volume shows that the real convergence
has yet to occur, but it also offers enough samples of interesting and insightful work to make
the endeavor look promising.
Torsten Wilholt
Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100 131, D-33501 Bielefeld,
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Harry J. Gensler. Historical dictionary of logic. Historical Dictionaries of Reli-
gions, Philosophies, and Movements, vol. 65. The Scarecrow Press, Lanham (Maryland),
Toronto, and Oxford, 2006, xliv + 307 pp.
The book under review is a sort of an encyclopedia of logic. The author declares in the
Preface that he understands logic as a discipline analyzing arguments and helping us to see
which ones are valid. The aim of the book is to introduce the central concepts of logic in
a series of brief, nontechnical articles. The book emphasizes deductive logic but there are
also entries on areas like inductive logic, fallacies, definitions as well as key concepts from
epistemology, mathematics and set theory.
Logic is nowadays developed by philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists. In
the book under review the philosophical branch of logic is emphasized. Therefore the areas
in which philosophers are interested and which they teach are first of all taken into account.
The mathematical and computer-science items as more technical and more specialized have
not been treated so extensively.
The main part of the book is a dictionary section consisting of 352 entries. They are ar-
ranged alphabetically and are devoted to fundamental concepts and problems of logic. The
most significant theories and issues arising out of Western philosophy and other traditions,
the more common fallacies and argument forms are presented and explained. There are
entries on historical periods and figures, including ancient logic, medieval logic, Buddhist
logic, Aristotle, Ockham, Boole, Frege, Russell, Go¨del, Peano, Quine, etc. One finds there
information on propositional logic, modal logic, deontic logic, temporal logic, set theory,
many-valued logics, mereology, paraconsistent logic. There are also entries concerning appli-
cations of logic to various fields such as philosophy, mathematics or computer science. The
presupposed character of the book excluded very technical expositions but the author suc-
ceeded to explain technical problems—as, for example, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems—in
an adequate way not using complicated technical apparatus. The entries vary in length from
a sentence or two to several pages.
One should stress that the book under review provides the potential reader not only with
knowledge about well established canon of logical notions and concepts but it indicates and
explains also many modern, still being developed and studied theories and achievements
in logic, in particular those connected with computer science or fuzzy logic as well as with
cognitive science.
The front of the book has three important parts: (1) a short notation section, (2) a
chronology starting from the ancient Greece and going to 2001, (3) an introduction where an
overall view of logic is given (it should provide a broader context for the dictionary entries).
